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STANDARDS OWNERSHIP AND
COMPETITION POLICY
HERBERT HOVENKAMP *
Abstract: Antitrust law is a blunt instrument for dealing with many claims
of anticompetitive standard setting. Antitrust factfinders lack the sophisti-
cation to pass judgment on the substantive merits of a standard. In any
event, antitrust is not a roving mandate to question bad standards. It re-
quires an injury to competition, and whether the minimum conditions for
competitive harm are present often can he determined without examin-
ing the substance of the standard itself. When government involvement in
standard setting is substantial, antitrust challenges generally should be re-
jected. The petitioning process in a democratic system protects even bad
legislative judgments from collateral attack. In any event, antit•ust's pur-
pose is to correct private markets. It is not a general corrective for politi-
cal processes that have gone awry. The best case for antitrust liability oc-
curs when the government somehow has been deceived into adopting a
standard that it would not have adopted had it known the true facts. Even
then, nonantitrust remedies such as equitable estoppel are probably a su-
perior solution.
INTRODUCTION
Antitrust's purpose is to protect competition while giving firms
reasonable freedom to innovate, develop, produce, and distribute
their products. Although standard setting can enable firms to improve
along all of these avenues of business progress, it also can facilitate
both of antitrust's twin evils: collusion and exclusion. This Article ex-
plores some of the ways antitrust policy can evaluate claims that pri-
vately promulgated standards are anticompetitive without hindering
socially beneficial conduct.
For antitrust purposes, a standard is usefully defined as a set of
technical specifications that provides a common design for some
product or process.' Although the focus of standard setting today is
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law and History, University of Iowa College or
Law.
Sre 2 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS & MAKE A. LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST:
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED To INTELLEcTuAt. PROPERTY LAW § 35. I a,
at 35-3 (2002 & Supp. 2006). On antitrust and standard setting generally, see id. at ch. 35.
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high-technology industries with significant technological sophistica-
tion, the history of antitrust reaches back to standards that were less
complex. The U.S. Supreme Court's first antitrust decision on the
merits involved a joint running arrangement among railroads that
included a significant standard-setting component. 2 The Court con-
demned the arrangement as nothing more than a cartel, ignoring the
lower courts' conclusions that the agreement was intended primarily
to coordinate schedules and standardize freight classifications, cargo
transfer protocols, and the like. 3
In sonic ways, standards resemble intellectual property ("IP")
rights. Economically, the increased welfare that they produce is largely
a consequence of product improvement, not of prices that are brought
closer to marginal costa As a result, some of the same antinomies ex-
ist between antitrust and standard setting as exist between antitrust
and IP rights. Effective promulgation of standards may involve a cer-
tain amount of coordination of output by rivals and a certain amount
of market exclusion—both things that antitrust generally abhors. 5
Further, the development of appropriate standards is often a Research
and Development activity, characterized by up-front costs and amorti-
zation over long time periods.
Standards also share one important characteristic with technology
choices generally: they can become path dependent. Once a standard is
adopted and technology designed around the standard, switching costs
increase, making the exercise of durable market power possible. 6 Stan-
dards often are subject to significant network effects. As a result, they
acquire increased value per user as they are more widely adopted.? This
See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 91)
CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic E//ems, 86 GAL. L. Rim 479, 515 (1998); David .). 'recce & Edward F. Sherry, Stan-
dards Setting and Antitrust, 87 MINN. L. Rim 1913 (2003).
2 United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 58 F. 58, 79-80 (8th Cir. 1893), rev'd, 166
U.S. 290 (1897): sec also Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism
and the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1041 (1988). Even the setting of track gauges in
nineteenth-century railroading promoted a standards batik. See HERBERT tiOVENKAMP,
Trip: ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND ExmoTioN 284 (2006) [hereinafter Ho-
vEN KAM P, TliE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE].
3 iiROD-2110., 58 F. at 79-80.
2 HOVEN KA MP, JANIS & LEM LEY, supra note 1, § 35,2b, at 35-9 to -10.
S Id. at 35-8 to -9.
6 SeeTeece & Sherry, supra note 1, at 1937.
For example, the model electrical code at issue in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. In-
dian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 495 (1988), was a standard with considerable exclusionary
power because it was adopted almost verbatim by thousands of communities across the
country.
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can facilitate the exercise of market power because the standard's own-
ers will be able to charge more for products compatible with the stan-
dard, or perhaps for access to the standard itself. Some, but certainly
not all, standards are capable of conferring significant market power. In
certain cases, an "insider" with respect to some standard has a sig-
nificant market advantage over outsiders, and thus may be in a position
to set a price substantially above costs. This can happen if duplication
of the standard is costly and compliance with it is essential for market
success. For example, when compatibility with the standard is techno-
logically essential, or when a government rule requires that a specific
standard be followed, standards can have significant exclusionary
power, provided that they are difficult to appropriate. Although IP
rights do not inherently confer significant market power, 8 some II'
rights do, particularly if they control effective access to a market. The
same thing is largely true of standards. Some are easily complied with,
widely shared among a large group of firms, or unnecessary For success-
ful competition in the market. 9 Such standards are completely consis-
tent with robust competition. Others are tightly controlled, however,
and effective access may be restricted to a small number of firms.'"
Standards also can have some of the other consumption charac-
teristics shared by IP rights. For example, an additional firm can adopt
a standard without taking any production away from the standard's
owner, other than the right to obtain royalties by licensing the stan-
dard. At the same time, many standards are not licensed at all, but are
g See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1293 (2006) (holding that
tying plaintiff nutst prove that the defendant has market power in the tying product,
thereby upsetting half-century-old antitrust presumption in the federal courts that a patent
in a tying product confers market power upon the patentee for purposes of a tying claim
against the patentee).
9 See, e.g., Found, for Interior Design Educ. Research v. Savannah Cull, of Art & Design,
244 F.3d 521, 531-32 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that privately promulgated accreditation
standards lbr interior design schools were not anticompetitive because there was no evi-
dence that accredited schools had any market advantages over nonaccredited ones);
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 558 (1st Cir.
1974) (holding that private standard setting for swimming pool heating and circulatory
systems did not restrain trade because it was a common practice, a "matter of salesman-
ship").
10 E.g., In re Union Oil Co. of Cal. (Unocal), No. 9305, 2004 FTC LEXIS 115, at *1--3
(F.T.C. July 7, 2004) (evaluating alleged misrepresentations by a company with a patented
standard for cleaner-burning gasoline mandated by state law); In re Rambus, Inc., No.
9302, 2004 WI, 300647, at pt. 4 (F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2004) (evaluating a patented standard for
RAM chips), so aside by No. 9302, 2006 WL 23301 17 (ETA]. Aug. 2, 2006).
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given away, in the sense that anyone who is willing to conform to them
is invited into the relevant area of enterprise."
The most likely economic effect of private standard setting is in-
creased social value. By promulgating standards, producers can in-
crease both horizontal and vertical compatibility. By "horizontal" com-
patibility, I refer to compatibility as between competing goods that are
subject to a standard. For example, a user can substitute one brand of
compact disc, computer monitor, or shotgun shell for another in the
same computer or shotgun. By "vertical" compatibility, I refer to the
ability of goods to use the same inputs. For example, all Windows com-
puters run the same software, and all automobiles burn the same gaso-
line. Standards also can reduce consumer search costs, increase con-
sumer confidence, significantly reduce the costs of input suppliers,
make networking possible or at least much more efficient, or facilitate
the achievement of scale economies. As a result, there should be no
antitrust presumption against standards, even those that are jointly set
by competing firms.
Nevertheless, standards also can facilitate both of the evils that
concern antitrust law—namely, collusion and exclusion. Collusion is
possible when standards are created or enforced by competing pro-
ducers. 12 Exclusion is possible when standards are used to keep some
producers out of the market."
Thus, antitrust rules for standard setting permit the great major-
ity of standard-setting activities to proceed. But they also identify some
instances where standards arc used anticompetitively. Antitrust per-
forms this function best by clearly identifying the dangers, specifying
the conditions under which those dangers are likely to be realized,
and then paying special attention to standard setting in situations that
meet those conditions.
Importantly, if the standards in question are complex, the antitrust
decisionmaker must avoid becoming overly involved in the substantive
merits of the standard itself." Antitrust tribunals, particularly juries,
lack the technical skills to answer these questions, such as whether chi-
See, e.g., United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (5th Cir.
1980) (noting the generally open standards Ibr membership on real estate brokerage
boards); Brown v. Indianapolis 13d. of Realtors, No. II' 76-587-C, 1977 WL 1405, at *1-2
(SD, Ind. May 11, 1977) (same); cf. SCFCILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 961 (10th
Cir. 1994) (noting that Visa joint venture is open to any institution that qualifies fur FDIC
insurance).
12 13 HERIIIIRT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW i 2136, at 231 (2d ed. 2005).
13 M. ll 223I at 409.
14 Id. 11 2235a, at 436.
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ropractic is really a legitimate form of medical practice, 15 whether a
particular medical procedure is safe and effective, 16 or whether a par-
ticular engineering standard is necessary for passenger limousines. 17
Well-formulated antitrust rules should try to evaluate standard setting
whenever possible by avoiding these difficult technological issues.
In the great majority of cases, an antitrust tribunal can evaluate
standards by looking, not at the substantive "reasonableness" of the
standard itself, but at issues such as the number and identity of the per-
sons making the standard, the exclusionary power that the standard
generates, or other signs of the standard's potential to Facilitate collu-
sion or exclude rivals and facilitate the exercise of market power. 18 This
is not to say that antitrust always can avoid substantive evaluations of
standards, but rather that it need do so in only a few situations.
The history of antitrust policy suggests that it has been unreasona-
bly hostile toward private standard setting. Nonetheless, many of the
early standard-setting antitrust cases provoked legitimate competitive
concerns, and some were nothing more than fronts for naked collusion.
1. STANDARDS, PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION, AND COLLUSION
One explanation for antitrust's traditional hostility toward joint
standard setting is that many of the early cases involved obvious, often
ham-handed, attempts at price fixing. 19 This seemed to create a mind-
set that found jointly set standards to be anticompetitive.
Standards facilitate collusion by minimizing product or service
differentiation, or by making product specifications or terms readily
observable across sellers. 20 Cartels are much more difficult to manage
when products are differentiated or sold subject to unique specifica-
tions. 21 The fewer variables that cartel members must observe, the
15 See Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352, 378 (7th Cir. 1990) (condemning Ameri-
can Medical Association ("AMA") standard-setting rule that excluded chiropractors).
16 E.g., Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d 397, 400 (7th Cir.
1989) (radial keratotomy); Hassan v. Spicer. No. 05-CV-I 526(FB) (CB), 2006 WL 228958, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2006) (nuclear cardiolog)).
17 See Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 363 F.3d 761, 774-76 (8th Cir.
2004); see also, e.g., Consul. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 297 (5th
Cir. 1988) (oil well drilling heads); Moore v. Boating Indus, Ass'ns, 819 F.2d 693, 710 (7111
Cir. 1987) (submersible boat trailer tail lights); Eliason Corp. v. Nat'l Sanitation Found.,
614 F.2d 126, 130-31 (6th Cir. 1980) (commercial refrigerators).
18 13 HOVENKAMP, supra note 12,1 2232a, at 414.
19 See Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 40-41 (1912).
22 13 HOVENKAMP, septa note 12, 1 2136, at 232.
21 See HOVENKAMP, Tin ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 2, at 132; RICHARD A. POS-
NER, ANTITRUST LAW 75-76 (2d ed. 2001); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDusTitiAL
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easier it is to stabilize a cartel equilibrium. 22
 These observations gen-
erally apply to both "explicit" price fixing and to the more informal
methods of collusion generally associated with oligopoly industries.
Antitrust history is fairly filled with attempts to facilitate collusion
by standardizing products, terms of sale, delivery; or other compo-
nents of a transaction. In Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United
States in 1912, a cartel of bathroom pottery manufacturers was lcd by a
patentee who licensed its finishing process to other cartel members. 23
The cartel then designated goods that did not employ this process as
"seconds" and required cartel members either to destroy them or ship
them abroad in a fairly obvious attempt to reduce the output sold on
the domestic market. 24
 In addition, the cartel fixed the price of all the
goods that were designated first quality. 25
In the more famous National Macaroni Manufacturers Ass'n Federal
Trade Commission case of 1964, the defendants responded to a tempo-
rary shortage of durum semolina wheat by setting a product standard
for pasta that called for 50% durum semolina and 50% inferior farina
wheat. 26
 The standard was intended to suppress the price of durum
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 279 (3d ed. 1990). On oligopoly pric-
ing under product differenlia6011, See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST Pot.-
ucv: TILE LAW or CompETmoN AND l'I'S PRACTICE §§ 4.1a, 4.2a, 4.4b, at 149, 161, 170 (3d
ed. 2005); W. KIP Viscusi, JotiN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTONJR., ECONOMICS
RECULATIoN AND AyrrruusT 108-12 (3d ed. 2000).
22 See Ser I E R & Ross, supra note 21, at 279.
23
 226 U.S. at 35-36 (holding dint the trade agreement violated antitrust laws); cf Milk
& Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478, 482-83 (7th Cir. 1946) (noting testimony "that
sales of 'firsts' as 'seconds' was a method of indirect price cutting").
24
 Standard Sanitary, 226 U.S. at 40-41.
25 Id. at 44.
26 See Nat'l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, {1963-1965 Transfer Binder .] Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCEI) 11 16,897. at 21,931-32 (F.T.C. Apr. 30, 1964) (entering order prohibiting Associa-
tion from taking concerted action to lix the proportion of ingredients in macaroni), en-
forced, 345 F.2(1 421 (7th Cir. 1965). In the recent and troublesome decision in Golden
Bridge Terhuolop, Inv. v. Nokia, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 525, 535 (E.D. Tex. 2006), the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas found that a plaintiff adequately alleged a
collusion claim based on product standardization. The plaintiff complained that it devel-
oped a patented technology for cellular phones that it wished to license to the cell phone
companies. Id. at 527-28. Acting through their standard-setting organization, however, the
cell phone companies adopted standards that excluded the technology and thus avoided
the license fees. Id. The court refused to clisiniss a complaint that adoption of the standard
amounted to a per se antitrust boycott. Id. at 535. Although a standard-setting organization
is free to adopt a lower-cost standard, the effect of its adoption nay be to prevent individ-
ual members from licensing the disapproved technology even if they wanted to. Neverthe-
less, antitrust's per se rule is reserved for practices that are so clearly anticompetitive that
detailed inquiry into the market structure or the effects of the practice is unnecessary.
Golden Bridge hardly seems like such a case. The court distinguished Allied Tube & Conduit
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semolina, and thus reduce the defendants' production costs. 27 Simi-
larly, GO-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. United States in 1952 involved nothing
more than a naked cartel, accomplished by turning a product-
differentiated industry into a completely standardized one. 28 The de-
fendants made fire extinguishers that were publicly bid to government
purchasers such as schools. They agreed on product specifications that
were so detailed that the extinguishers could not he differentiated from
one another except by the manufacturer's identification tag. 29 In con-
demning the restraint, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found, first, that it facilitated price fixing, and second, that the stan-
dards were completely unnecessary to the safe and effective operation
of the fire extinguishers." Notwithstanding the obvious advantages of
standardized container sizes, the Seventh Circuit reached the same con-
clusion in the Milk & Ice Cream Can Institute v. FTC case, which involved
Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988), discussed infra note 59 and accompanying
text, and held that the per se rule applies in the context of private standard-setting organi-
zations. In Allied Tide, however, the plaintiff was not asking other manufacturers in the
organization to license its technology; it simply wanted market approval side-by-side with
other products.
27 Mitt Macaroni, 11963-1965 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCII) at 21,931-32.
Contrast Wig Manufacturers Institute v. FTC 174 F.2c1. 452, 463 (1st Cir. 1949), which refused
to condemn a trade association's rules that both standardized the format and design of
shipping tags and required detailed reporting concerning prices. The FTC had argued
that the product standardization made price collusion much easier; the court replied:
Nor is the conclusion of the Commission strengthened by its finding that the
administration or the reporting agreements 'was materially assisted by the
standardization of the component parts of tags and tag products developed
and adopted under the auspices of the respondent Institute.' ... These stan-
dardizations are deemed to be to the advantage of all concerned, including
the consumer who, among other benefits, is thereby better enabled to know
what he is buying and to make intelligent price comparisons. or course, the
detailed standardization of tags and components which the Institute has as-
sisted in developing tends to make more serviceable the information re-
ported ... under the Tag Industry Agreement and ... collated and dissemi-
nated among the Subscribers. But if the reporting agreement is otherwise
lawful, such enhanced usefidness of the agreement as results from standardi-
zation would hardly infect it with illegality.
Id. at 461-62.
28 197 F.2d 489, 491-93 (9th Cir. 1952); see also United States v. Ant. Radiator & Stan-
dard Sanitary Corp., 433 F2d 174, 185-86 (3d Cir. 1970) (condemning standard-setting
agreement on plumbing fixtures that effectively eliminated lower-price, lower-quality prod-
ucts).
28 GO Two Fire, 197 F.2d at 493.
90 Id. at 496-97.
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agreements that standardized the sizes of milk containers when the
agreements were being used to facilitate price Hxing. 31
Several antitrust cases also involved standardization of terms of
sale and delivery. For example, in Catalano, Inc. v. Urge( Saks, Inc. in
1980, the Supreme Court condemned an agreement that standard-
ized credit terms for the wholesaling of beer to retailers. 32
 The courts
have routinely condemned "basing point" pricing and related agree-
ments among sellers to standardize delivery terms. 33 And in the fa-
mous 1936 Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States case, the Supreme Court
condemned an agreement among sugar manufacturers to issue stan-
dardized price lists for sugar and then to adhere to the lists while they
were in force. 34
To be sure, the pricing mechanism itself can he improved by stan-
dard setting. Standardized price terms can reduce consumer search
costs and minimize fraud or misrepresentation. Here, antitrust has
taken the administratively defensible position that, for most pricing
standards, the risks of collusion are simply too high in relation to the
gains. 35
 As a result, promulgation of standards concerning pricing
should come from the government. 30 Indeed, even here, some of the
most anticompetitive statutory regimes are those that regulate such
things as the posting of retail liquor or wine prices, effectively permit-
ting sellers to collude. 37
A few of these decisions, such as Milk Institute, undoubtedly
reached too fan But most probably did not. Further, they carry a fairly
important message: product differentiation is still an important value,
31 152 F.2d at 482.
32 446 U.S. 643, 643 (1980); see 12 novENKANIP, supra note 12, ¶ 2022, at 170.
" E.g., FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co.r., 324 U.S. 746, 750 (1945) (condemning an agreed-
upon basing-point pricing system for the sale of glucose); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324
U.S. 726, 732, 738 (1945) (similar); see also FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 696-700
(1948) (condemning agreement to employ basing-point pricing, noting its tendency to
lead to complete uniformity of pricing, particularly when the product at issue is fungible);
Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484-85 (1st Cir. 1988). On the
economics of these decisions, see Dennis W. Carlton, A Reexamination of Delivered Pricing
Systems, 26 J.L. f3.: EcoN. 51 (1983). See generally David D. Haddock, Basing-Point Pricing;
Competitive v. Collusive Theories, 72 Am. ECON. Rev, 289 (1982); George J. Stigler, A Theory of
Delivered Price Systems, 39 Am. ECON. Rim 1 143 (1949).
34
 297 U.S. 553, 601-05 (1936).
33 12 llovENRANIV, Sr//MO note 12, ¶ 2021, at 162; POSNER, supra note 21, al 39.
36 A notable exception is California Dental Assn u FTC, 526 U.S. 755, 771-78 (1999)
(vacating Ninth Circuit decision because the case requires more thorough inquiry where
anticompetitive effects of restraints on advertising are tar from obvious).
37
 E.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 470 U.S. 335, 341-43 (1987); TFIVS, Inc. v. Schaefer,
242 F.3d 198, 210 (4th Cir. 2001).
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primarily because consumers have different preferences, but also be-
cause it makes collusion more difficult to sustain. Standards that do
no more than reduce product differentiation in order to facilitate
price matching do not provide a social benefit.
The values of product differentiation probably do not extend to
the sizes of milk containers, however. And school children might he
safer if all fire extinguishers work exactly the same way so that teach-
ers reliably can be trained one time for all of them. So, antitrust must
tread carefully even when it is attacking standard setting that might
facilitate . collusion. If standard setting is accompanied by price fixing,
as it very likely was in the C- -Two and Milk Institute decisions, then
the antitrust tribunal always can respond by condemning the price
fixing. But most cases are more difficult and involve situations where
standardization facilitates express or tacit collusion, but the collusion
itself is evidenced only by parallel prices. In those cases, antitrust fac-
tfinders must look .at other factors. For example, do consumers
benefit from the standard setting? Do the standards create the kind of
product homogeneity that facilitates collusion, or do they merely
regulate safety or functionality in ways that permit significant product
differentiation along other avenues? It is also important to determine
whether nonproducer interests have a significant role in the standard
setting. For example, while fire extinguisher producers have an inter-
est in colluding on the price of fire extinguishers, fire insurance com-
panies do not; they are benefited by fire extinguishers that work as
well as possible and are sold competitively.
Finally, the number of firms in the market is often important. Car-
tels become much more difficult to manage as the number of sig-
nificant firms in a market rises above a dozen or so. 38 Informal cartels,
or those relying on tacit rather than express collusion, may require
even fewer. Although a large number of participants is an indicator that
collusion is less likely, in some cases collusive output reductions and
higher prices are quite possible even though the market has numerous
competitors. This can happen when the standard in question is itself a
direct restraint on output or pricing and violation of the standard is
readily observable by other cartel members. For example, even though
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (the "NCAA") has several
hundred members, its rule limiting nationally televised football games
98 SC1 ERER & Ross, supra note 21, at 277.
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reduced output anticompetitively. 39
 No member could surreptitiously
cheat on the cartel by secretly televising a football game. In the Su-
preme Court's 1984 decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University
qf Oklahoma, the Court invalidated the NCAA plan, noting that it cre-
ated higher prices and lower output than would occur in a free market
situation. 4° In sum, a large number of firms in the market subject to
standard setting is often relevant, but needs not be decisive. One must
always consider how the collusive restraint on output or price is being
carried out.
II. EXCLUSION AND STANDARD SETTING
Before firms can charge monopoly prices, they must be able to
do two things. The first is to coordinate the output and pricing deci-
sions of existing producers.'" The difficulty of accomplishing this
ranges From nil in the case of the monopolist, which absolutely con-
trols its own price and output, to quite severe if the market has a large
number of firms, particularly if the firms use different technologies or
produce differentiated products.
The second requirement for firms to charge monopoly prices is
to keep the output of others out of the market. 42 Standard setting can
accomplish this by setting standards in such a fashion that only a small
number of compliant firms meet the standard, or that the standard is
licensed only to such firms.
At the same time, if a standard-setting process is at all meaning-
ful, one or more firms will either "flunk" the standard or else have to
make a significant investment to comply with it. The most common
antitrust claim involving standard setting is that it limits competition
by excluding rivals, whether through restrictive bar passage rates, 43
39
 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104-13 (1984). At the
time of the litigation, the NCAA had 850 members. Id. at 89.
4° The Supreme Court noted that the District Court found that if member institutions
were free to Nell television rights, many more games would be shown on television, and that
the NCAA's output restriction has the effect of raising the price the networks pay for tele-
vision rights. Id. at 105 & ii.29 (citing Bd. of Regents or the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F.
Stipp. 1276, 1294 (W.D. Okla. 1982)); (j: Nat'l Soc'y of Won Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 682, 692-93 (1978) (condemning canon against competitive bidding that af-
fected 69,00(1 members of Society, of whom 12,000 were active consulting engineers). .
41
 13 HovEsikAm P, Slipra note 12,1 22316, at 411.
42 Id. II 2231c, at 412.
43
 Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 569-74 (1984) (holding drat bar exam grading
standards that were promulgated by state supreme court qualified for antitrust "state ac-
tion" int/tinnily); Mothershed V. justices of the Supreme Court (Ariz.), 410 F.3d 602, 609
(9th Cir. 2005) (similar),
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hospital accreditation standards that exclude chiropractors,'" surgical
standards that protect against cost-cutting medical procedures, 45 or
building code or product safety standards that protect incumbent
firms from threatening technologies. 46 For example, network stan-
dards might keep some firms off the network, perhaps imposing pro-
hibitive costs on them in the process. 47 Closely related is the proprie-
tary standard protected by IP rights, whose licensing costs imposed on
rivals create a price umbrella protecting the IP holders. Sometimes
these standards are created or made enforceable with the help of the
government," thus implicating antitrust's Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
which gives a measure of quasi-constitutional protection to petitions
to the government for anticompetitive actions. 49 Sometimes they are
created by private bodies that have a significant influence over gov-
ernment decision making. 50
To repeat an earlier warning: antitrust is often way outside its
competence when it attempts to evaluate standard setting by examin-
ing the technological merits of the challenged standard. Although
44
 Wilk v. Am. Med, Assn, 895 F.2d 352, 378 (7th Cir. 1990) (condemning AMA rule
excluding chiropractors from access to important inputs such as hospital X-ray facilities):
see also Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 870 F.2d. 397, 400 (7th Cir. 1989)
(upholding standards for eye surgery that allegedly discriminated against radial keratot-
only); Hahn v. Or. Physicians' Sens, 868 F.2d 1022, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 1988) (evaluating
exclusion of podiatrists); cf. Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. ABA, 107 E3d 1026,
1031-32, 1038-41 (3d, Cir. 1997) (upholding law school accreditation standards that, in
part, linked accreditation to professor salaries); Notice Regarding United States v. ABA, 60
Fed. Reg. 39,421, 39,422 (Aug. 2, 1995) (announcing consent decree limiting American
Bar Association's ability to tie law school accreditation to faculty compensation),
45 Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pintas, 500 U.S. 322, 326 (1991) (evaluating claim by physi-
cian who was allegedly denied staff privileges because he had developed a lower-cost pro-
cedure for conducting eye surgery that required only one surgeon instead two) .
46 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. V. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496-97 (1988)
(evaluating claim against defendants who manipulated standard-setting organization to
disapprove plaintiff's plastic electrical conduit in order to protect the market for tradi-
tional steel conduit); Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
558-64 (1982) (considering Society's liability when its officer participated in a fraudulent
scheme to discredit plaintiff's valve); Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Ain. Petroleum Inst., 846
F.2d 284, 297 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding no antitrust violation when institute made tip of
manufitcturers and users of oil well equipment refused to approve plaintiff's allegedly in-
novative and lower-cost design).
47 13 HOVEN KA AI P, supra note 12, 1 2233, at 429.
48 E.g., Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 509-10; In re Union Oil Co. of Cal. (Unocal), No. 9305,
2004 FTC 1..EX1S 115, at *87-106 (ETC. July 6, 2004).
49 See Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents Con-
ference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 130 (1961).
su E.g., Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 495 (National Fire Protection Association); Ilydroleuel,
456 U.S. at 558-59 (American Society of Mechanical Engineers).
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antitrust contains a rule of reason, "reasonableness" in this context
refers to the impact of a standard on competition, not to the substan-
tive reasonableness of the standard itself. 51
 In most private antitrust
cases, the plaintiff seeks damages and, as a result, most of them con-
template a jury trial. Except in clear cases of abuse, juries are not up
to answering technical questions concerning the necessity or appro-
priateness of a particular standard. 52
A. Concerted Standard Making and Exclusion
The antitrust problem of concerted standard setting that excludes
rivals is a half-century old, including the 1943 American Medical Assti. v.
United Stales (AMA) case which condemned the AMA for adopting an
"ethical" standard that forbade physicians from working for prepaid
health organizations. 53 The grandparent of explicit product safety stan-
dards cases is the 1961 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke
Co. decision, in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained the complaint
of a gas heater manufacturer, alleging that it was excluded from the
market by an industry safety standard that had been biased and capri-
ciously enlorced. 54
Radiant Burners suggested that one should evaluate standards by
looking at the intent of those setting them. The defendants in that
case included not only competing manufacturers of gas heaters, but
also natural gas utilities and pipeline companies. 55
 One easily can see
why a competing heater manufacturer would wish to exclude a
cheaper or more efficient burner, or simply remove rivals from the
market generally. But natural gas utilities and gas pipeline companies
sell a complementary product and ordinarily would not have any in-
centive to keep a safe, efficient heater off the market, Indeed, they
51 13 HOVENKAM 1', supra note 12,11 2232a, 2232b, at 414, 415.
52 Id,11 2232a, 2235a, at 414, 436,
53
 317 U.S. 519, 532-33 (1943).
54 364 U.S. 656, 657-60 (1961) (reversing lower courts' dismissals on pleadings);
Carleton v. Vt, Dairy Herd Improvement Ass'n, 782 F. Supp. 926, 934 (D. Vt. 1091) (hold-
ing that plaititiffs claim that market-dominating milk-testing organization disapproved his
milk without subjecting it to a fair test stated claim under rule of reason); NkCreery Angus
Farms v. Am. Angus Ass'n. 379 F. Stipp. 1008, 1018, 1020 (S.D. III. 1974) (granting pre-
liminary injunction against enforcement of plaintiff's suspension resulting from dispute
over blood typing; emphasizing denial of due process or any effective riglit to challenge
association decision making or even obtain a clear statement of the problem), aff'd mem.,
506 F2t1 1404 (7th Cir. 1974). But see Eliason Corp. v. Nat'l Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d
126, 130-31 (6th Cir. 1980) (approving standard-setting program that did not attempt to
exclude disapproved products from the market or test them in a discriminatory fashion).
55 Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. at 656 n.I
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might share liability for fires caused by unsafe heaters. Further, al-
though control of the natural gas industry by a burner maker or even
a cartel of them is possible, it is quite unlikely and almost certain to be
apparent to a factfinden
This scenario suggests that an early inquiry into challenges to
exclusionary standard setting should be structural, asking whether the
defendants (or a controlling number of them) are likely to have anti-
competitive incentives. The Seventh Circuit's 1987 Moore v. Boating
Industry Ass'ns decision suggests the proper approach. 56 There, the
plaintiff made a submersible tail light for boat trailers, which was ex-
cluded by an association of boat trailer manufacturers because of a
tendency to short out. 57 The court found no antitrust violation, ob-
serving that the plaintiff tail light manufacturer did not compete with
the trailer makers who controlled the association, and that trailer
manufacturers would have no incentive to place an anticompetitive
restraint on tail light manufacturers. They wished only to purchase
safe tail lights that complied with federal specifications. 58
As with standard setting intended to facilitate collusion, the
number of players can be relevant. If the firms in a market are so nu-
merous that collusion is impossible then they may have little incentive
to exclude another firm. However, even firms that arc behaving com-
petitively vis-a-vis one another have an incentive to exclude lower-cost
or superior technologies from the market, particularly if they cannot
readily obtain access to the technology. Even if the slide rule market
contains a hundred firms that compete aggressively on price and slide
rule design, these firms still have an incentive to keep electronic cal-
56 &e$ l 9 F.2d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 1987).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 700. The court stated:
Manufacturers of boat trailers, some of which are members of TMA, are
customers for trailer lamps. The trailer manufacturers do not make lamps.
There is no competition between lamp and trailer manufacturers, The latter
are the customers of the limner.
, It would seem to make no difference to a trailer manufacturer from
whom he bought lamps, so long as they complied with federal safety stan-
dards and thus did nut expose the trailer manufacturer to federal penalties of
fines and recalls.
Id.; see also NI & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 980 (1st Cir. 1984)
(finding track owners excluding plaintiff had legitimate intentions and no anticompetitive
motive); Jessup v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 61 F. Stipp. 2d 5, 6 (S.D.N.V. 1999) (rejecting
antitrust challenge to breed standards because American Kennel Club "does not compete
or engage in the breeding, selling or showing 0r. Labrador Retrievers), of/il mere., 210 F.3d
111 (2d Cir. 2000).
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culators off the market if they believe that the calculators constitute a
major competitive threat to the demand for slide rules. For example,
the standard-setting organization in the Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v.
Indian Head, Inc. Supreme Court case contained several thousand
members. 59
 In that case, a manufacturer of steel electric conduit, fear-
ing that the plain tin plastic conduit was both cheaper and superior,
organized a cartel that manipulated the standard-setting process so as
to disapprove the plastic conduit. In this case, the numerosity of the
membership did not mitigate competitive concerns because the con-
cern was not price fixing, but rather the removal of a threatening, su-
perior product from the market. Someone who wanted to cheat on
the cartel could not surreptitiously flood the market with the ex-
cluded product.
B. Standard Maldng and Unilateral Acts by Dominant Firms
In markets where interfirm compatibility is valuable, dominant
firms (or dominant cartels or coalitions) typically profit by maintain-
ing incompatibility with rivals. 60
 By maintaining incompatibility, a
dominant firm protects itself from new entries or raises the costs of its
rivals—for example, consider United States v. Microsoft Corp. involving
Microsoft's efforts to ensure that the Windows operating system would
not become compatible with rival operating systems and that new rival
systems would not be permitted to emerge. 61 By contrast, survival or
growth for a nondominant firm may require it to become compatible
with the dominant firm's technology. 62
Exceptions exist to both of these rules. First, a dominant firm
may decide to open its architecture, believing it can earn more from
marketwide acceptance and licensing. IBM made this decision with
respect to the personal computer architecture in the early 1980s. Sec-
ond, even a nondominant firm, such as Apple Computer, might wish
59
 486 U.S. at 494. According to its website, the National Fire Protection Association
(the "NFPA") has 79,000 members today. NFPA, About Us, littp://www.apa.org
 (follow
"About Us "
 hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 1, 2006). The number involved in the vote to dis-
approve plastic conduit was 784, and the conduit was disapproved by a vole of 394 to 390.
See Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 497.
6° 3A Plump E. AREEDs HERBERT. FlovENKAmi., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 776, at 232 (2d
ed. 2002).
" See 87 F. Sum. 2d 30, 43-44 (D.D.C. 2000) (speaking of Microsoft's efforts to pre-
vent Sun Microsystem's Java from becoming a medium that would make rival operating
systems more compatible with Microsoft Windows), affil in part, retid in part, 253 F.3d 34
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
62
 .See 3A AREEDA & HOVEN KAM l', .sitpra note 60. 1 776, at 232.
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to preserve incompatibility in a product-differentiated market if it oc-
cupies a profitable market niche.
In monopolized markets, "standard setting" often refers to noth-
ing more than the dominant firm's selection of a standard, which
other firms are largely obliged to accept or else be relegated to small
niches. For example, once Kodak, a film monopolist, selects a format
for its Instamatic, cartridge-loading camera-and-film system, rival cam-
era makers such as Berkey Photo may have very little choice but to
design a compatible camera. 65
Should a dominant firm's unilateral selection of a standard be
grounds for antitrust liability when the de facto result is that the se-
lected standard becomes the market standard, perhaps raising the costs
of rivals or, in extreme cases, excluding them altogether? Antitrust does
not condemn no-fault monopolization." About the closest we have
ever come is an "essential facility" doctrine that may force a firm to
share a technology that is essential for market access. 65 The Supreme
Court's 2004 Verizon Communicalions, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Dinka,
UP decision, however, leaves few opportunities for use of that doc-
trine. 66 It seems true, therefore, that a firm selecting a technology for
its own products has no duty to protect its rivals' market by ensuring
the compatibility of their competing or complementary products.
The essential facility doctrine speaks of the terms under which a
firm may be required to share an existing technology. 67 The inten-
tional selection of a technology that excludes rivals, however, is a
more aggressive act. One might say that, although a firm has no duty
to share its resources or inputs, it does have an obligation not to
adopt a standard that excludes rivals unnecessarily. But antitrust tri-
bunals cannot be in the business of making technology choices for
firms. Further, product complementarity is a common feature of
technologically sophisticated products and incompatibility is often a
63 Berkey. Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 279-85 (2d Cit .  1979) (rejecting
claim that Kodak had an antitrust. obligation to "prediscluse" its design so that rivals could
invent around it and have copies ready by the time the product was in ti(Kluced); if Cal.
Computer Prods. v. IBM, 613 F.2(11 727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that 11451 did not vio-
late antitrust laws when it designed a personal computer with integrated components that
forced rivals to adopt the same technology).
6+ tier SA ÄREEI1A & HOVEN KAMP, Supra note 60,1 7711, at 232-33.
65 14. '1 773, at 195-96.
" 540 U.S. 398, 410-11 (2004) (holding that alleged breach of statutory obligation did
not state an antitrust claim and noting that the Snpretne Court never has recognized an
essential facilities doctrine).
67 3A AREEDA & HOVEN KAM P, 311phl note 60, 4 773, at 196.
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consequence of technological success. If Kodak's Instamatic film sys-
tem had been a flop, a rival camera maker would be unlikely to com-
plain about its inability to produce complementary products. 68
Another reason for deferring to the technology choice of the
dominant firm is that, typically; the old technology remains available. In
that case, consumers are not injured by the dominant firm's innovation
because they can still purchase the older product; they simply fail to
obtain the full benefit of competition in the new technology. To be
sure, this is not necessarily the case. Kodak might simultaneously intro-
duce its Instamatic film system and withdraw from the older film for-
mat, thus forcing all consumers to the new technology. But it is difficult
to claim that consumers are injured by a new, monopolized technology
when the existing technology remains fully in place. About all we can
say is that consumers lose the ability to migrate to the new technology
at the competitive price.
One might conclude rationally that a completely unilateral tech-
nology choice that becomes an industry standard should never be the
basis for an antitrust claim, no matter how much damage the tech-
nology choice does to rivals. Among the range of positions that one
could take on this issue, I believe this would be better than any posi-
tion that required juries to make substantive technological judgments
(except in very clear cases) or that tried to discern a defendant's in-
tent. It clearly would be better than any rule that required courts to
make substantive ex post assessments about the consumer benefits
that result from a particular technological choice. Innovation always
occurs under great uncertainty, and not every successfully marketed
innovation is a clear winner for consumer welfare.
A rule of complete nonliability probably goes too far, however.
Situations exist where firms set out to redesign products fOr no other
purpose (objectively measured) than to make rival technologies in-
compatible. The CR Bard v. M3 Systems case in the Federal Circuit in
1998 may have been such a situation. 69
 C.R. Bard was the holder of
68 Sell Berke). Photo, 603 F.2d at 279-85.
69 157 F.Sd 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Of course, the incompatibility has to be real, in the
sense that the excluded firm cannot easily intimate around it. See Medtronic Minimed, Inc.
v. Smiths Med. MD, Inc., 371 F. Stipp. 2d 578, 587-88 (D. Del. 2005) (holding that pat-
entee of medical infusion pump with attachable disposable infusion sets did not violate
Sherman Act by incorporating patented locking device on pump so as to be incompatible
with plaintiff's infusion sets when nothing prevented the plaintiff from designing a com-
patible infusion set); see also H DC Med., Inc. v, Minntech Corp., 411 F. Stipp. 2d 1096, 1102
(D. Minn. 2006) (holding that defendant did not tie two components of kidney dialysis
equipment together simply because its software for using the First machine was incompati-
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multiple patents relating to a biopsy gun used for taking skin samples. 70
The gun itself was durable, but it used disposable needles that captured
and enclosed tiny pieces of human skin, which could then be sent to
the laboratory. 71 The needles had been unpatented and were made by
numerous manufacturers, subject only to the requirement that their
connection end be structurally compatible with the collar on the gun. 72
C.R. Bard then redesigned the collar and developed a new patented
needle" that was the only one compatible with the gun. The jury re-
jected C.R. Bard's argument that the redesigned gun collar and needle
were a technological improvement."
Assuming the strongest case—namely, that the dominant firm
intentionally redesigned its dominant product in such a way that it
was not an improvement at all, but simply moved complementary
products from a competitive to a monopolized environment—one
might wish to preserve some basis for antitrust liability. Of course, one
still needs to ask how a dominant firm can "monopolize" by making a
complementary product incompatible with that of rivals. The so-
called "leverage" theory of tying arrangements, which was that tying
of monopolized and complementary products turned one monopoly
into two, was discredited in the literature a half-century ago." Kodak
or C.R. Bard can earn all the monopoly profits available in their mar-
kets by setting a monopoly price for the camera or biopsy gun. They
cannot make a larger monopoly profit simply by monopolizing the
complementary products as well.
One reason a firm in Kodak's or C.R. Bard's position might try to
create incompatibility in complementary products is to further price
discrimination. if the value that users place on the biopsy gun is a func-
tion of how often they use it, then C.R. Bard can charge a higher price
for needles and earn greater returns from high-intensity users than
from low-intensity users. Price discrimination itself is not a good reason
for condemning such a practice because its welfare consequences are
so indeterminate. Such a price discrimination scheme is likely to in-
ble with a rival's complementary machine; in this case, there was other solovare available
that could operate with the two machines together).
7° C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1346-48.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1347.
7S Actually; the new patent was a combination patent covering the gun phis the needle.
See id.
74 Id. at 1382.
75 Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem. 67 YALE L.J. 19,32—
36 (1957); see HOVENKAMP, supra note 21, § 10.6a, al 422.
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crease rather than reduce the output of biopsy guns, thus making it a
poor candidate for a claim of monopolization." Further, the profitabil-
ity of even inefficient price discrimination schemes does not necessarily
depend on the exclusion of a rival. Section 2 of the Sherman Act is not
a mandate to the courts to condemn economically inefficient practices,
but only those practices that are unreasonably exclusionary. 77
But there are other explanations for why firms might try to create
incompatibility in complementary products. For example, viable com-
petition in the market for the complementary product might provide
the platforin for entry into the market for the primary product. Or al-
ternatively, innovation by rivals in the complementary product might
increase the likelihood that alternative technologies will emerge. For
example, the concern in Microsoft was not that Microsoft wanted to ex-
clude Netscape in order to charge higher prices for either Windows or
Internet Explorer. Rather, Microsoft wanted to exclude Netscape be-
cause a viable Netscape complemented with Java would increase the
compatibility between Windows and rival operating systems, or else fa-
cilitate the emergence of rival platforms. 78 If that should happen, Mi-
crosoft might be relegated to one among many players in a product-
differentiated operating system market. As is so often the case in anti-
trust, such concerns are highly specific to the industry. As a result, one
hesitates to adopt overly categorical rules in either direction.
Another issue concerns the firm that participates in a standard-
setting process while withholding information about IP rights that it
has or is in the process of perfecting. Although the facts vary, in the
typical "holdup" case, the firm waits until the standard has been
adopted and then surprises participants by asserting the IP right and
demanding royalties from those that cannot comply with the standard
without infringement." Antitrust remedies for this unilateral conduct
are appropriate only for monopolization. This does not mean that
76 For example, under the older technology, C.R. Bard would charge everyone the
profit-maximizing price for the gun because it has no control over the needles, which are
sold in a competitive market_ Under the new scheme, it might charge less than the mo-
nopoly price for the gull, or even give it away, but place all (.11. part of the overcharge in the
needles. As a result, low-intensity users unwilling to pay the old monopoly price will be able
to purchase the gun, and, of course, C.R. Bard will earn even more from high-intensity
risers who consume a large number of needles. See 1 -1UVENKAMP, supra note 21, § 10.6e, at
428.
77
 See i AREEDA HOVENKANIP, supra note 60, 1 103, at 40 (2t1 ed. 2000).
78 See liovt:Niumu, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra hole 2, at 292-98,
79 See '2 HOVENKAMP, JANIS & UNITES", supra 110 IC I, § 35.5b, at 35-37; Teece & Sherry,
supra note 1, at 1938-42.
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antitrust should never intervene when such holdup abuses occur, but
it must stick to its focus on power and anticompetitive effects. Some
courts have held that antitrust law does not apply to holdup problems
because, under the antitrust laws, a firm is free to refuse to license its
patents. 80 That position is incorrect, however, because it confuses two
issues. One is the fact that a "mere" refusal to license is not an anti-
trust violation. 81 The other is that compulsory licensing of patents is a
common remedy for conduct that has been found to violate the anti-
trust laws. 82
Nevertheless, a misrepresentation rises to the level of an antitrust
violation only when it permits the offender to dominate a market, or
creates a dangerous probability that this will occur. Or to say it differ-
ently, the misrepresentation satisfies the conduct component of the
offense of monopolization or attempt to monopolize, but the struc-
tural component of the offense and causation must also be proven. 83
Proving structure may require a showing that the standard dominates
a relevant market, and also that the patent is either necessary for meet-
ing the standard or that the costs of meeting it without infringing the
patent are higher.
As a result, doctrines derived from the patent laws or contract law,
such as equitable estoppel, generally are more appropriate for address-
ing such holdup problems." Most importantly, standard-setting proc-
g° See Townshend v. Rockwell Intl Corp., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1011, 1018, 1021, 1024 (N.D,
Cal. 2000) (reasoning from premise that the antitrust laws do not impose a duty to license
to conclusion that alleged fraudulent misrepresentation before a standard-setting body did
not violate the antitrust laws when the requested remedy involved compelled licensing).
Si See I HOVENKAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra 1101C. 1, at ch. 13. Compulsory licensing is a
rarity in patent law, although there are sonic exceptions. For example, an unused 1970
amendment in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2000), provides that the U.S. Attorney
General can seek judicially supervised compulsory licensing of patented technology neces-
sary to achieve clean air standards, where such licensing might he needed tai avoid giving
the patentee a monopoly.
82 Contra 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, SUpra note 60,11 709-710, at 220, 236.
83 See 2 HOVENICAMP, JANIS & LEMLEY, supra note 1, § 35.5b, at 35-42 to -43.
84 See Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1100-01 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (re-
fusing to find a duty to disclose under state common law of fraud; also finding that stan-
dard could be met without infringing Rambus's patent claims); Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsu-
bishi Elecs. Ant., 103 F.3d 1571, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that patentee was
equitably estopped from asserting a patent when it had encouraged others to adopt a
standard containing the patent); Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Proxim Inc., No. Civ. 01-801-SLR,
2004 WL 1770290, at *7-8 (D. Del. July 28, 2004) (refusing to assert equitable estoppel
where patentee did not mislead other participant in standard-setting process about the
existence of its patents); Stambler v. Diebold, Inc., 11 U.S,P.Q.2d 1709, 1714-15 (E.D.N.Y.
1988) (holding that patentee who knew it had patent covering standard adopted in proce-
dure in which it participated, and who kept silent, was later equitably estopped front en-
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esses must be defined in such a way as to give firms incentives to dis-
close their IP claims and place a price on them in advance of adoption,
after which the exercise of market power typically is far more likely. 85
Failures are probably best addressed via the institutional design of stan-
dard-setting procedures, including predisclosure obligations, rather
than by antitrust.
III. GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN ANTICOMPETITIVE
STANDARD SETTING
Federal and state governments are the largest standard setters in
the economy. The vast majority of these standards are readily available
for private appropriation and completely consistent with competition.
For example, government agencies might define a standard for grade
A milk or prime beef, bar passage and licensing of attorneys, or safety
of electrical components. Any firm or person that can comply with the
standards may sell lawfully in the market. 86
Claims that direct government involvement in private standard
setting is anticompetitive typically arise in one of two ways. In the first,
some governmental or quasi-governmental entity adopts a standard
put forward by private firms that is claimed by rivals to be anticom-
petitive. Such an action can implicate the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
which declares that qualifying petitions to the government cannot be
antitrust violations, even if the intent or effect of the requested action
is anticompetitive. 87
 For example, in the 1991 City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Adventure, Inc. U.S. Supreme Court case, the city of Columbia,
South Carolina adopted a land use standard regulating the size, loca-
forcing the patent), affil mem., 878 F.2(1 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also In re Dell Computer
Corp., No. 931-0097, 1995 FTC LEXIS 466, at *10 (F.T.C. Oct. 20, 1995) (creating consent
decree under which Dell agreed not to assert IP rights when it had represented in stan-
dard-setting process that it in fact had no such rights); tf. In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302,
2004 WL 390647, at pt. 4 (F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2004) (comprising an initial decision in which
the administrative law judge held that a firm could withhold information about. pending
patent applications even when the standard-setting process in which it was participating
required disclosure), set aside ley No. 9302, 2006 WL 2330117 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006). These
issues are thoroughly explored in 2 14ovENKAnw, JANts & LEML1EY, supra note I, § 35.5b, at
35-37 to -48. See generally Lemley, .supra note 1.
85 See generally Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Bautnol, Reasonable and Nondisenminatory
(RAM)) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power; 73 AN"FITRUST 14.1 (2005).
8C' For example, the standards for electrical components at issue in Allied Tube & Con-
duit Corp. V. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1988), were placed in local govern-
ment building codes.
87 See Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents Con-
ference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 130 (1961).
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Lion, and spacing of billboard signs that favored the signs of a politi-
cally favored business firm and excluded those of a rival. 88 The Su-
preme Court applied the historical Noerr rule that private parties have
a right, essentially protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Con-
stitution, to petition the government for even anticompetitive ac-
tions. 89 Rivals cannot use antitrust suits to challenge the legislation or
executive action that results. Indeed, the Noerr case itself was about a
standard-setting campaign by railroads to induce the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania to impose cost-increasing standards on truckers that
were competing with the railroads for freight business." The history
of regulation is fairly filled with the efforts of interest groups to im-
pose restrictive standards on rivals that either increase the rivals' costs
or remove their competition from the market altogether. 91
Significantly, Noerr protects the petitioning process by which anti-
competitive government regulation is made. It does not, however, pro-
tect the marketplace results of that process. For example, if a group of
businesses petitions a legislature for a statute that gives the businesses
the authority to exclude competition by setting standards, Noerr would
protect the group's right to obtain this legislation. Under the antitrust
"state action" doctrine, however, private conduct approved by that
statute still could be challenged unless it was "actively supervised" by a
public official or agency. 92 The same rule generally applies to federal
regulatory standards: private standard setting promulgated under
88 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Acker., Inc„ 499 U.S. 365, 367-68 (1991).
99 Id. at 379-80.
90 Men-, 365 U.S. at 129-30.
91 E.g., TEC Cogeneration, Inc. V. Fla. Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560, 1573 (11th Cir.
1096) (government restrictions on power Cogeneration), modified on tehk, 86 Rid 1028
(11th Cir. 1996); Nat'l Bd. for Certification in Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. Am. Occupa-
tional Therapy Ass'n, 24 F. Supp. 2d 494, 508-09 (D. Md. 1998) (legislative adoption of
licensing restrictions on occupational therapists); Christian Mem'l Cultural Ctr. v. Mich.
Funeral Dirs. Ass'n, 908 F. Stipp. 772, 778 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (regulations directed at dis-
count funeral services); see 1 AREEDA & HOVENRAMP, supra note 60, ¶1 201-204, at 145-
214 (3d ed. 2006).
92 Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 102-0(1 (1088) (finding inadequate state supervision
to immunize physician discipline by peers); Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd., 894 F,2d 1024,
1030 (9th Cir, 1980) (finding inadequate state supervision to immunize private standard
setting for surgical procedures), aff'd on other grounds, 500 U.S. 322 (1991); Jiricko v. Cof-
feyville Mem'l Hosp. Med. Ctr., 700 F. Stipp, 1559, 1563 (I). Kan. 1988) (similar); rf. Fades
v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants of La., 139 F.3d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that state board setting accountancy standards needs no supervision); Health Care
Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Med. Soc'y, 851 F.2d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir. 1988) (immunizing
exclusion of chiropractors from insurance coverage pursuant. to medical society accredita-
tion decision because a state official supervised the process).
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such regimes is not immunized from the antitrust laws unless the rele-
vant federal agency exercises sufficient oversight over the conduct."
The second way that claims arise that direct government involve-
ment in private standard setting is anticompetitive is when a firm gives
false information that distorts the process by which a government stan-
dard is created or applied. 94
 The previously discussed standards holdup
problem can implicate Noerr when the standard maker is the govern-
ment. For example, in In re Union Oil Co. of California (Unocal), a firm
allegedly proposed standards for low-emission fuel to a state air quality
agency while surreptitiously perfecting patent claims that covered those
very standards. 95
 Once the standards were adopted, the firm surprised
rivals with the patents and requested large license fees. 9"
As in the case of purely private standard setting, antitrust liability
in holdup cases should be reserved for the relatively rare situation in
which there is a clear misrepresentation to the government standard
95 See Silver V. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341. 357-60 (1963) (holding that unsuper-
vised discipline by N\SE, a private group, is not immunized); see also MCI Commc'ns Corp.
v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1102-03 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that AT&T's unilateral set-
ting of standards for interconnection by competing carriers was not immunized when it
was not sufficiently supervised by regulatory agency); Litton Sys., inc. v. AT&T Co., 700
F.2d 785, 807 (2d Gil:, 1983).
91 See Israel v. Baxter Labs., Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (considering mis-
representations to FDA as part of drug approval process); cf. St. Joseph's Hosp., Inc. v.
Hosp. Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948, 955 (11th Cir, 1986) (finding that misrepresentations in
application to state agency Ibr certificate of need for new medical facility did not enjoy
111111111114).
95 In re Union Oil Co, of Cal. (Unocal), No. 9305, 2004 FTC LEXIS 115, at *6_7 (F.T.C.
July 6, 2004).
9" As the FTC observed:
Awareness of potential competitive harm is particularly 'm1)01111111 in settings
like the one presented here. Government regulations such as CARB's stan-
dards may impose potent entry barriers capable of preserving market power
over extended periods of time. Whereas an exercise of unprotected market
power may sow the seeds of its own erosion if firms are free to enter and
compete on equal terms with the incumbent, governmentally-cidbrced limits
on entry may impede and even prevent that process. Consequently., misrepre-
sentations 111111 distort government decision making in ways that create or
shield market power may inflict severe and long-lasting public harm. Such
considerations support our conclusion that the substantial public interest in
antitrust enforcement may outweigh countervailing policy reservations when
those concerns are sufficiently nutted.
Id. at *55-56 (citations omitted). The dispute eventually was resolved by a consent decree
in which the FTC approved a merger between Unocal and Chevron, and Chevrorragreed
to dedicate the disputed patents to the public. See Press Release, Chevron, Federal Trade
Commission Accepts Chevron's Acquisition of Unocal (June 10, 2005), available at imp://
www.chevron.com/news/press/2005/2005-06-10_1.asp.
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maker and clear evidence that the agency relied on the misrepresenta-
tion in setting its standard. In addition, the usual structural require-
ments for an antitrust violation must be met. Noerr protects a right to
petition the government, but not the right to make false statements to a
government decisionmaker. And, of course, one does not even get to
these issues unless it is clear that the resulting standard plus the defen-
dant's IP rights create a clear likelihood of monopoly pricing. This
could occur if the IP rights effectively excluded other firms from mak-
ing the product subject to the standard and if that exclusion made it
impossible for rival firms to compete effectively. Once again, the case
for a patent law remedy such as equitable estoppel is at least as strong
here as it is in the case of the private standard-setting organization.`-t 7
CONCI,UsiON
Given the ubiquity of standard setting in our economy and its tin-
disputed promotion of social welfare, claims of anticompetitive stan-
dard setting must be scrutinized very closely. Antitrust law is a fairly
blunt instrument for dealing with such claims. Except in easy cases, an-
titrust factfinders lack the sophistication to pass judgment on the sub-
stantive merits or a standard. In any event, antitrust is not a roving
mandate to question bad standards. It requires an injury to compethion,
and whether the minimum conditions for competitive harm are pre-
sent often can be determined without examining the substance of the
standard itself.
When government involvement in standard setting is substantial,
antitrust challenges generally should be rejected. The petitioning
process in a democratic system protects even had legislative judgments
from collateral attack. In any event, antitrust's purpose is to correct pri-
vate markets. It is not a general corrective for political processes that
have gone awry. The best case for antitrust liability in this context oc-
curs when the government somehow has been deceived into adopting a
standard that it would not have adopted had it known the true facts.
Even then, nonantitrust remedies such as equitable estoppel are
probably a superior solution.
97 However, see Bristol-Myers Squibb Co, u !mirth nex Corp., 84 F, Stipp. 2d 574, 578 (D.N.J.
2000), which concluded that because Noerr protected a firm's right to obtain an exclusive
license based on alleged misrepresentations to the government, promissory estoppel based
on the same alleged misrepresentations could IRA be used to prevent it fro n t enfin .cing
that right.
